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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Janell Ozuna raised two fundamental errors to challenge the jury's guilty verdict for
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Both errors were
claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, she argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct
by repeatedly commenting and eliciting testimony on her silence to infer guilt. Second, she
argued that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting testimony that had been ruled
inadmissible by the district court. She argued that these errors violated her unwaived
constitutional rights, were clear from the record, and were not harmless. The State responded and
disputed each prong of the fundamental error standard for both misconduct claims. This Reply
Brief addresses some, but not all, of the State's arguments.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Ozuna outlined the facts and proceedings in her Appellant's Brief (App. Br., pp.15.) They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by reference.

1

ISSUES
I.

Did the prosecutor violate Ms. Ozuna's constitutional rights to remain silent and to a fair
trial by repeatedly using evidence of Ms. Ozuna's silence to imply guilt?

II.

Did the prosecutor violate Ms. Ozuna's constitutional right to a fair trial by eliciting
testimony previously deemed inadmissible on Ms. Ozuna's prior police contact?

2

ARGUMENT
I.

The Prosecutor Violated Ms. Ozuna's Constitutional Rights To Remain Silent And To A Fair
Trial By Repeatedly Using Evidence Of Ms. Ozuna's Silence To Imply Guilt
On Ms. Ozuna's first claim of prosecutorial misconduct, she argued that the prosecutor
violated her constitutional rights to remain silent and to a fair trial by eliciting testimony and
commenting on her silence to imply guilt. (App. Br., pp.7-18.) The State responded that the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 (2013), allowed the prosecutor's use
of Ms. Ozuna's silence at trial. The State's reliance on Salinas is entirely misplaced.
Before examining Salinas, it is critical to recognize "when and how" the prosecutor used
Ms. Ozuna's silence in this case. (See App. Br., pp.8-9.) See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60
(2011) ("In the case of post-arrest silence, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance as to
when and how that silence can and cannot be used by the State at trial."). Ms. Ozuna identified
four instances of misconduct. (App. Br., pp.10-15.) First, the prosecutor informed the jury in
opening statements that Ms. Ozuna did not "adamantly deny" that the pipe was not hers after
Officer Parsons told her that she was under arrest. (App. Br., p.1 O; see also Tr. Vol. I, 1 p.122,
L.25-p.123, L.4.) Second, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Officer Parsons that Ms. Ozuna
did not "say anything" or "adamantly" deny ownership of the pipe either during or after he

1

The appellate record contains one .PDF document with three separate transcripts, each with its
own pagination. For ease of reference, citations to the three transcripts will refer to the separate
transcripts by volume and its internal pagination. Citations to "Tr. Vol. I" will refer to the first
transcript in the document (pages 1-55 of total document), containing day one of the jury trial,
held on February 15, 2018. Citations to "Tr. Vol. II" will refer to the second transcript in the
document (pages 56-59 of total document), containing the pre-trial conference, held on
February 13, 2018. Citations to "Tr. Vol. III" will refer to the third and final transcript in the
document (pages 60-88 of total document), containing day two of the jury trial, held on
February 16, 2018, and multiple sentencing proceedings.
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arrested her. (App. Br., pp.10-11; see also Tr. Vol. I, p.134, L.1-p.135, L.4.) Third, the
prosecutor elicited testimony from Ms. Ozuna on cross-examination that she failed to "offer any
other explanation" or "adamantly deny" that the pipe was hers during or after Officer Parsons
arrested her. (App. Br., pp.11-13; see also Tr. Vol. I, p.205, L.1-p.206, L.12, p.207, L.23-p.208,
L.8.) Fourth, the prosecutor argued in closing that Ms. Ozuna did not say anything or deny that
the pipe was hers during or after her arrest. (App. Br., pp.14-15; see also Tr. Vol. III, p.15,
L.24-p.17, 2 L.2, p.29, Ls.8-25.) In all, save for one comment in closing, 3 the prosecutor used
Ms. Ozuna' s silence when she was in custody-Ms. Ozuna remained silent during and after her
arrest.
Turning to how the prosecutor used Ms. Ozuna's silence, the prosecutor clearly used it to
infer guilt. (See App. Br., pp.10-15 & n.6.) In opening statements, Officer Parsons's direct
examination, and closing argument, the prosecutor implied that the jury should find Ms. Ozuna
guilty because her failure to assert her innocence meant she had knowledge. According to the
prosecutor, an innocent person talks and a guilty person stays quiet. Moreover, the prosecutor did
not use Ms. Ozuna's silence to prove her version of the events was not credible. In fact, Officer
Parsons's and Ms. Ozuna' s testimony was strikingly similar on her single denial after the pipe
shattered, her arrest, and her decision to remain silent upon her arrest. There was nothing to
impeach with respect to Ms. Ozuna's testimony on her arrest. The prosecutor's use of her silence
was not for an impeachment purpose, such as challenging Ms. Ozuna's credibility or rebutting a
new story, but to prove her guilt by staying silent upon her arrest. See State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho
709, 714 (1999) (prosecutor's "salvo" on cross-examination was a Fifth Amendment violation,

2

Ms. Ozuna's Appellant's Brief incorrectly cites to page 27, not 17. (See App. Br., p.14.)
The prosecutor also argued that Ms. Ozuna' s pre-arrest silence right after the pipe shattered was
evidence of guilt. (Tr. Vol. III, p.15, L.24-p.16, L.4.)
3
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and not harmless, because prosecutor went "far beyond" the use of defendant's silence for any
legitimate purpose, such as to contradict defendant's new exculpatory version of events not told
to police, and was used to establish guilt).
With this framework in mind, Salinas is completely inapplicable. In Salinas, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a federal circuit court split on "whether the
prosecution may use a defendant's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination during a

noncustodial police interview as part of its case in chief." 570 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added)
(plurality opinion). But the U.S. Supreme Court did not resolve the split. Id.; see also id. at 193
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). The U.S. Supreme Court declined to answer whether the
prosecution may use a defendant's pre-custody silence as evidence of guilt because, in Salinas,
the defendant never invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege during his voluntary interview at the
police station. Id. at 182-83, 185-86 (plurality opinion). The defendant voluntarily answered the
police's questions and did not assert the privilege when he was silent for one particular question,
so he could not claim a Fifth Amendment violation. Id. at 182, 185-86. Thus, this narrow
holding from Salinas has no bearing on the instant case. Salinas held a defendant must invoke
his Fifth Amendment privilege during a non-custodial, voluntary interview in order to claim a
subsequent violation of the privilege by the prosecutor at trial. Salinas's holding does not extend
in any way to custodial silence during an investigatory detention, that is, silence upon arrest.
Moreover, although Salinas did not resolve this question for the federal courts, this Court
has resolved whether, in the State of Idaho, a prosecutor may use pre-arrest silence as substantive
evidence of guilt. In State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132 (2014), a post-Salinas decision, the Court
held that the prosecutor may not use pre-arrest silence to imply guilt. Parker, 157 Idaho at 147;

see also State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 566 (2013) (same). Numerous state court (and several
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federal circuit courts) have reached the same conclusion. State v. Tsujimura, 400 P.3d 500, 512
(Haw. 2017) (discussing cases). For example, in Tsujimura, the Hawaii Supreme Court agreed
"with the federal circuit courts of appeals and the several States that have held as
unconstitutional the use of prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt." Id. at 513 (agreeing
with Idaho, as well as appellate courts in New Hampshire, New Jersey, Wyoming, Washington,
Nebraska, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Utah, and the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth
Circuit). The Hawaii Supreme Court reasoned that a contrary holding would incentivize police
officers to delay interrogation or giving Miranda 4 warnings to create an intervening period of
silence that could be used later to imply guilt. Id. at 514. As another basis to prohibit pre-arrest
silence to prove guilt, the Hawaii Supreme Court explained that the prohibition is in line with an
individual's right to remain silent during an investigatory stop:
Proscribing the use of prearrest silence that occurs at least as of the time that a
person has been detained is also consistent with the well-established tenet that a
person being questioned by a law enforcement officer during an investigatory stop
"is not obliged to respond." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). If
the State were authorized to use a person's silence during an investigatory stop as
substantive evidence of guilt, it would effectively punish a person for exercising a
legal right, a result that is constitutionally unacceptable.

Tsujimura, 400 P.3d at 514. Finally, the Hawaii Supreme Court "emphasize[d]" that the
prosecutor's use of the defendant's silence was not silence in response to a specific question, as
in Salinas, but was simply the failure to volunteer information to the police officer. Id. Looking
at this situation, the appellate court recognized:
[P]ermitting silence to serve as an implication of guilt would mean that the State
would always be able to use as substantive proof of guilt prearrest silence not
made in response to a question by a police officer. The prosecutor need only
identify a point in time during the defendant's interaction with the police officer
when no question was posed and no verbal exchange was had (and, therefore, the
defendant was expectedly silent) and use that silence as evidence to infer the

4

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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defendant's guilt. This would engender a result where, in any encounter between a
law enforcement officer and a citizen, the State would be able to adduce evidence
of prearrest silence in myriad ways ....
Id. at 514-15. For all of these reasons, the "better rule is that which holds that the defendants'
Fifth Amendment right not to have their silence used against them in a court proceeding is
applicable pre-arrest and pre-Miranda warnings. The constitutional right is always present."
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,820 (1998).
Even though the Court's protection of pre-arrest silence does not directly apply herebecause the prosecutor used Ms. Ozuna's post-arrest silence-this discussion demonstrates the
Court's limitations on a prosecutor's use of silence and its protection of the privilege. A
prosecutor cannot use pre- or post-arrest silence as evidence of guilt. Parker, 157 Idaho at 14 7.
Moreover, the giving of Miranda warnings certainly does not lessen and, if anything, reinforces
these pre- and post-arrest protections. See Moore, 131 Idaho at 820 ("While the presence of
Miranda warnings might provide an additional reason for disallowing use of the defendant's
silence, they are not a necessary condition to such a prohibition."); State v. White, 97 Idaho 708,
714-15 (1976) ("If a prosecutor is allowed to introduce evidence of silence, for any purpose,
then the right to remain silent guaranteed in Miranda . . . becomes so diluted as to be rendered
worthless."). Even the U.S. Supreme Court in Salinas acknowledged that "due process prohibits
prosecutors from pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings
.... " 570 U.S. at 188 n.3 (plurality opinion) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618
(1976)); but see also id. (distinguishing this protection in pre-Miranda situations). Indeed, the
Court has ruled that the giving of Miranda warnings is immaterial to determine whether the
prosecutor can use silence to infer guilt: "[T]his Court has held that a defendant's right to remain
silent attaches upon custody, not arrest or interrogation, and thus a prosecutor may not use any
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post-custody silence to infer guilt in its case-in-chief" Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60 (citing Moore,
131 Idaho at 820). As such, an arrested defendant is protected against the prosecutor's use of his
silence even if it is ''unclear" whether the police officer "Mirandized" him. Id. at 60-61. The
only exception to the protections outlined by this Court is pre-Miranda silence, either pre- or
post-arrest, for impeachment purposes. Parker, 157 Idaho at 14 7. The use of silence to prove
guilt is still prohibited if it is pre- or post-arrest and pre- or post-Miranda. Parker, 157 Idaho at
147; Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60-61.
It is clear from the Court's precedent that a defendant need not invoke his right to remain

silent before, during, and after an arrest to avoid having his silence used against him at trial to
prove his guilt. In cases before and after Salinas, this Court has not required any invocation to
assert this protection. Compare Ellington, 151 Idaho at 60-61 (pre-Salinas), with State v.
Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 421, 422-23 (2017) (post-Salinas); State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221,
232-35 (2014) (same); Parker, 157 Idaho at 147 (same). Invocation is not required due to the
implied promise in Miranda warnings:
Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's
exercise of these Miranda rights. Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly
ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested.
Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance
that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who
receives the warnings.
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-1 (citation and footnote committed). As such, a defendant is protected
from a prosecutor's use of his silence to prove guilt pre- and post-arrest, even if the defendant
did not invoke his right to silence.
This protection during an arrest is distinguishable from protection in a police interview,
where the U.S. Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have required invocation. Under
Salinas, a defendant must unambiguously invoke his Fifth Amendment right if he chooses not to
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answer a question in a noncustodial, voluntary interview with the police. 570 U.S. at 182-83,
185-86 (plurality opinion). As the State points out in its Respondent's brief, the Court of
Appeals in State v. Neyhart, 160 Idaho 746, 752-55 (Ct. App. 2016), recognized the Salinas
invocation requirement during a police interview. (Resp. Br., pp.13-15.) But see Parker, 157
Idaho at 147 (prosecutorial misconduct for commenting on defendant's silence during
noncustodial police interview, without any invocation requirement, or any evidence in the record
on whether defendant received Miranda warnings). Regardless, the Salinas analysis of a clear
invocation has no bearing on an investigatory stop and arrest situation. This Court does not
require the defendant to establish that he received Miranda warnings or that he invoked his
Miranda rights to avoid the prosecutor's use of his pre- or post-arrest silence at trial. See
Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421, 422-23 (prosecutorial misconduct for eliciting testimony on police's

unsuccessful attempt to interview defendant pre-arrest, and no invocation requirement);
Skunkcap, 157 Idaho at 235 (prosecutorial misconduct for using post-arrest silence in jail cell

during police's attempted interview, and no invocation requirement); Parton, 154 Idaho at 565568 (prosecutorial misconduct for using post-arrest and post-Miranda silence, and no invocation
requirement); Ellington, 151 Idaho at 59-61 (prosecutorial misconduct for using on post-arrest
silence, and no invocation requirement or evidence on issuance of Miranda warnings); Moore,
131 Idaho at 820-22 (prohibiting prosecutor's use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to prove
guilt). White, 97 Idaho at 714-15 (prosecutor's comments on post-arrest silence constituted
fundamental error). This use of silence, either by eliciting testimony or in argument, constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct.
The improper use of Ms. Ozuna's silence occurred here. In opening statements, Officer
Parsons's direct examination, Ms. Ozuna's cross-examination, and closing argument, the
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prosecutor used Ms. Ozuna's silence at the moment of her arrest and right after to prove her
guilt. (See App. Br., pp.10-15.) This was prosecutorial misconduct, in violation of Ms. Ozuna's
Fifth Amendment and due process rights. (See App. Br., pp.8-9, 15.) The State's reliance on
Salinas to dispute this misconduct, be it in opening statements, witness examination, or closing
argument, is irrelevant. Salinas does not apply. Therefore, the State's arguments in opposition to
prong one of the fundamental error standard fail. (See Resp. Br., pp.16-17, 19-21, 25-26, 2829.)
The State's arguments on prong two and three of the fundamental error standard are
equally unpersuasive. 5 For one, the State's assertion that Ms. Ozuna's counsel made a tactical
decision not to object to any of this misconduct because, according to the State, this evidence and
commentary on silence was permissible under Salinas is once again irrelevant. (Resp. Br., pp.18,
21-22, 27.) Further, Ms. Ozuna has provided more than appellate counsel's opinion that her trial
counsel's failure to object was a tactical decision. Ms. Ozuna has supported her opinion-that
"there is no conceivable strategy" for trial counsel "failing to object" to improper argument and
inadmissible evidence that makes "it vastly easier" for the jury to find Ms. Ozuna guilty-with
evidence in the record. See State v. Medina, Nos. 45117 & 45118, 2019 WL 4023555, at *7
(Aug. 27, 2019) (applying Perry 6 for prong two). The evidence is trial counsel's Idaho Criminal
Rule 29 challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on Ms. Ozuna's knowledge and trial
counsel's closing argument reminding the jury that "this is still America" where Ms. Ozuna had
the "right" to keep her "mouth shut." 7 (App. Br., pp.16-17; Tr. Vol. I, p.191, L.10-p.192, L.3;

5

Ms. Ozuna recognizes that State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115 (2019), became final on June 12,
2019. (See App. Br., pp.7-8 (noting the Perry and Miller standards for fundamental error).)
6
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
7
In trial counsel's "America" argument, he never expressly told the jury that this "right" could
not be used against her by the prosecutor at trial. (Tr. Vol. III, p.20, L.18-p.21, L.5.) In other
10

Tr. Vol. III, p.20, L.18-p.21, L.5.) Trial counsel's actions show that it was not strategic or
tactical not to object to the replete prosecutorial misconduct in this case. Clearly, if trial counsel
had known that the prosecutor's comments and elicitation of testimony were improper and
inadmissible, trial counsel would have objected, rather than making two arguments that did not
address, or even acknowledge, the errors head-on. Finally, on prong three, the State has not
shown how the prosecutor's use of Ms. Ozuna's silence to prove her guilt did not actually affect
the jury's verdict when the key evidence used by the prosecutor on the contested element of
Ms. Ozuna's knowledge was her silence. Without this evidence, the jury could have found
Ms. Ozuna not guilty. Therefore, this misconduct actually affected the trial's outcome.

II.
The Prosecutor Violated Ms. Ozuna's Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial By Eliciting
Testimony Previously Deemed Inadmissible On Ms. Ozuna's Prior Police Contact
On Ms. Ozuna's second claim ofprosecutorial misconduct, she argued that the prosecutor
violated her right to a fair trial by eliciting testimony from Officer Parsons on his "previous
contact" with Ms. Ozuna, despite the district court's ruling not to elicit such testimony. (App.
Br., pp.19-21.) The State responded that the prosecutor violated an evidentiary rule only and
therefore this violation did not rise to the level of a constitutional error. (Resp. Br., pp.33-34.)
Ms. Ozuna respectfully disagrees. Although in State v. Lanliford, 162 Idaho 4 77 (2017), the
Court held that the prosecutor's elicitation of testimony in violation of the district court's
evidentiary ruling "did not affect" the defendant's "due process right to a fair trial," this holding
is not a hard-and-fast rule for all prosecutorial misconduct premised on violations of court orders

words, he never argued to the jury that it could not consider Ms. Ozuna' s silence as evidence of
guilt.
11

or rules of evidence. Whether or not the prosecutor committed misconduct that rises to the level
of a due process violation depends on the facts of each case.
In Perry, for instance, the Court held that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
eliciting testimony from witnesses that vouched for the victims’ credibility. 150 Idaho at 228–29.
The Court declined to grant relief not because there was no constitutional violation at all, but
because the violation was not clear from the record. Id. at 229. The Court reasoned that
additional factual findings were needed to determine whether trial counsel’s failure to object was
strategic or tactical. Id. Similarly, in Parker, the Court held that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by eliciting testimony that the district court had ordered to be excluded from trial or
that the prosecutor had represented that he would not present to the jury. 157 Idaho at 144–45.
The Court further held, “The prosecutorial misconduct here may have impacted Parker’s right to
a fair trial, but Parker has not met his burden under the second prong” to show that his trial
counsel’s failure to object was not strategic or tactical. Id. at 145. Along the same lines, in
State v. Dunlap, the Court held that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting testimony
from an expert witness on his opinion of the weight the jury should give to certain evidence. 155
Idaho 345, 370 (2013). The Court again declined to grant relief because the Court determined
that the error was harmless. Id. at 371. The Court did not expressly hold that this misconduct did
not violate the defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 370–71. These cases indicate that
prosecutorial misconduct for violating the district court’s evidentiary ruling (and, consequently,
presenting inadmissible evidence to the jury) can result in a violation of the defendant’s right to a
fair trial, even though the defendant may fail to establish other prongs of the fundamental error
standard. Therefore, Ms. Ozuna submits that Lankford’s application of the fundamental error
standard to a prosecutorial misconduct claim in that case does not dictate the outcome of this
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case. She maintains that the prosecutor's misconduct here violated her right to a fair trial because
the prosecutor presented irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of her prior contact with a police
officer.
Ms. Ozuna does not respond to the State's arguments on prongs two and three of the
fundamental error standard, and she respectfully refers this Court to her Appellant's Brief on
these issues. (App. Br., pp.21-22.)

CONCLUSION
Ms. Ozuna respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and
remand her case for a new trial.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of September, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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